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Dye: Taxation of Mineral Interests

COMMENTS
TAXATION OF MINERAL INTERESTS UNDER ARTICLE
XII, SECTION 3 OF THE MONTANA
STATE CONSTITUTION
All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place, contaiing or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be
taxed at the price paid the United States therefor, unless the surface
ground, or some part thereof, of such mine or claim, is used for other
than mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value for
such other purposes, in which case said surface ground, or any part thereof, so used for other than mining purposes, shall be taxed at its value for
such other purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery used in mining, and all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant
to mines and mining claims which have a value separate and independent of such mines or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of all
mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided by law. MONTANA
CONSTITUTION,

ARTICLE

XII,

SECTION

3.

INTRODUCTION
The method in which the Montana Supreme Court has dealt
with Article XII, Section 31 of the Montana Constitution presents what
may be termed a classic case of state constitutional interpretation. Most
of the obvious questions concerning the various facets of Section 3 have
been answered in one form or another over the years, and by this process an underlying rationale or theory of that section's operation has
been developed. This process has not been entirely clearcut, however,
and much of the language in the various opinions is inconsistent both
with other opinions and with the underlying theory itself.
In part at least, this state of affairs is explainable by the fact that
the theory was developed through a process of case by case adjudication.
There is a natural and human tendency on the part of judges to tailor
the language of their opinions to fit the facts of the case before them.
When the facts are changed, an apparent conflict arises between the
exact "holding" and the literal language of the opinion. This tendency
is heightened where, as here, a significant percentage of the case law
arose from a single county-Musselshell-and involved many of the same
parties.

'Hereinafter textually referred to as Section 3. This provision is enacted substantially
verbatim as Revised Codes of Montana, § 84-5401 (1947) [hereinafter cited R.C.M.
1947 § 84-5401; earlier compilations will be cited by date].
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The purpose of this article is to attempt to highlight the consistent
language of the various cases and attempt to develop and expand upon
the theory of that section as it has been construed by the case law.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
A brief review of the territorial legislation concerning the taxation of mineral interests will be helpful in analyzing Section 3 and in
understanding the case law construing it. At all times it should be borne
in mind that mining occupied a paramount position in the eco-political
structure of the Territory from and prior to its inception.
The first legislation on the subject was contained in the Bannack
Statutes of 1864-65.2 That act specifically exempted "mining claims"
from taxation and provided that "all machinery used in mining claims,
and all property and improvements appurtenant to or upon mining
claims, which have an independent and separate value, shall be subject
to tax."
This provision was later amended to exempt "mines and mining
claims"' and still later to exempt "mines and mining claims except those
4
held under a patent from the United States."
engaged
In 1879, a net proceeds tax was imposed on persons ".
in mining upon a quartz vein or lode, or placer mining claim containing gold, silver, copper or lead.'"3
Section 5 of that act provided that
. ..no direct tax shall be levied upon any placer claim, quartz lead,
or lode, except to the extent of the price paid for the mining claim
in obtaining patent therefor from the government of the United
States, and the only taxation of the proceeds thereof shall be that
provided in this act: Provided, that this act shall not be so construed
as to exempt from taxation improvements consisting of buildings,
erections, or machinery placed upon any quartz lead or lode, or used
in connection therewith.'
The final step was to exempt
Mines, except on the net proceeds thereof, and mining claims, except those held under a patent from the United States, the surface
of which shall be taxed as other real estate, Provided, That all machinery used in mining claims, and all property and improvements
appurtenant or upon mining claims, which have a separate and independent value, shall be subject to taxes.'
The Act of February 21, 1879, remained in full force as Sections 1791
to 1795 inclusive of the Compiled Statutes of 1887.
This was the state of the law of mining taxation in Montana at the
time the Constitutional Convention met in 1889. The debates of that Con-

of Feb. 7, 1865 (Bannack Stats. of 1864-65 at 412).
'Act
8
Act of Jan. 15, 1869 (Mont. Terr. Leg., 5th Sess. at 42).
of Jan. 12, 1872 (Mont. Terr. Leg., 7th Sess. Chap. LXXXV, § 3).
'Act
5
Act of Feb. 21, 1879 (Mont. Terr. Leg., 11th Sess. at 65).
6Id at 67.
7
Act of Mar. 10, 1887, § 4 (Compiled Statutes of Montana, 1887, 5th Div., § 1668).
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vention, s as well as the text of Section 3 itself, make it clear that it intended to incorporate the law relative to mining taxation into the Constitution.
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 3
From the above, it is possible to make certain preliminary observations concerning Section 3. The first is that the language of that section
was directed primarily at the type of mining prevalent at the time of
its adoption, 9 e.g. gold, silver and copper mining. This has caused some
problems in the past and holds the potential for causing more in the future. 10 For example, it was necessary to resort to litigation to determine
that coal mining was within the contemplation of Section 3 even though
it was specifically enumerated therein, because coal mining is technically
neither "placer" nor "rock in place.'"
A second observation is that while Section 3 was adopted primarily
to benefit the mining industry,' 2 its purpose was not to exempt such
property from taxation. 3 Rather, when that section is read in conjunction with the other sections of Article XI1 4 and in light of the territorial
legislation on the subject, 15 it is apparent that it is in fact a revenue
measure.

16

The specific evil at which Section 3 was directed is the ad valorum
taxation of mineral deposits in situ.17 It was felt that the accurate estis
mation of undeveloped mineral wealth in place was an impossible task'
and that such a system would leave the valuation of such property up
to the predilections of individual assessors. 19 It was also felt, perhaps not

'STATE OF MONTANA,

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION,

470-9, 492-7 (1921).
'Hinz v. Musselshell County, 82 Mont., 502, 508, 267 P. 1113, 1115 (1928).

"'For example, see the discussion below under the heading

TAXATION

OF OIL AND

GAS

INTERESTS.

'Montana Coal and Coke Co. v. Livingston, 21 Mont. 59, 68, 52 P. 780, 781 (1898).
"Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper Co., 41 Mont. 509, 519, 110 P. 237, 241 (1910). However,
Section 3 has not always had the intended effect. See, e.g., Musselshell County v.
Morris Development Co., 92 Mont. 201, 209, 11 P.2d 774, 777 (1932) (mining claim
to be taxed at price paid the United States even though minerals thereon were
exhausted); State ex. rel. Hinz v. Moody, 71 Mont. 473, 485, 230 P. 575, 580 (1924)
(mining claims cannot be assessed at any classification less than 100% of the price
paid the United States).
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mjelde, 48 Mont. 287, 296, 137 P. 386, 388 (1913).
14
Especially §§ 1 (providing that the legislature shall provide the necessary money for
support and maintenance of the state), 2 (providing what property may be exempted
from taxation), and 16 (which provides that "all property shall be assessed in the
manner provided by law except as otherwise provided in this constitution").
IDiscussed above under the heading HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS.
18
Mjelde, supra note 13 at 297, 137 P. at 389; Barnard Realty Co. v. City of Butte,
50 Mont. 159, 164, 145 P. 946, 948 (1915).
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. Musselshell County, 54 Mont. 96, 105, 169 P. 53, 55 (1913);
Hinz, supra note 9 at 511, 267 P. at 1116.
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 106, 169 P. at 56. Cf.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 8 at 470.
1
'Northern Pac. Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 106, 169 P. at 56.
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without justification, that such a system would place an undue burden
20
on the development of the state's mineral resources.
At the same time, this desire to assist the mining industry was balanced by the opinion that that industry must be made to "respond to
the reasonable demands of the state for revenue."1
'
In order to resolve
these somewhat conflicting goals, a rather complicated scheme was worked
out. As a first step, the value of "mines and mining claims" purchased
as such 22 from the United States is arbitrarily23 set at the price for which
the land was purchased. 24 So long as the mining property remains in its
undeveloped state, this is the only tax levied on the owner.
Once the property is developed, the owner is required to pay, in
addition, property taxes on the machinery used in the operation2 5 and
a net proceeds tax on the mineral wealth as it is severed26 Finally, if
the owner uses the surface of the property 27 or any improvements thereon 25 for some purpose other than mining, he is required to pay ad valorum
29
taxes on the property based on its value for such other purposes.
It seems safe to assume that the Constitutional Convention had in
mind the various programs, then in effect, under which a person could
obtain title or right of possession to mineral lands at no cost or at a
nominal price per acre which did not reflect the potential mineral value
of any particular tract.30 It may also be assumed that it was felt that
land containing potential mineral wealth which was acquired under some
other program for the disposal of Federal lands, e.g. the Homestead Act,
would pay ad valorum taxes on its value for other purposes and would
thereby contribute to State revenue.31
. MINES

AND MINING CLAIMS..."

Section 3 speaks only in terms of "mines" and "mining claims."
After some initial struggle,3 2 it was determined that Section 3 applies
to all mineral deposits 3 in the state and not merely to "mines" and
"mining claims. ''
In other words, the purpose of that section is to for-

mMjelde, supra note 13 at 296, 137 P. at 388. Cf. PROCEEDINGS

AND DEBATES,

supra

note 8 at 477.
m
Mjelde, supra note 13 at 296, 137 P. at 388.
1Id. at 297, 137 P. at 389.
'Superior Coal Co. v. Musselshell County, 98 Mont. 501, 521, 41 P.2d 14, 23 (1935).
2
Hinz, supra note 9 at 510, 267 P. at 1115-6.
'Barnard Realty Co., supra note 16 at 164, 145 P. at 947.
t

"See cases cited, supra note 17.
Barnard Realty Co., supra note 16 at 164, 145 P. at 947.

2Hale v. Jefferson County, 39 Mont. 137, 143, 101 P. 973, 976 (1909).
"See cases cited, supra notes 27 and 28.
"Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 515, 41 P.2d at 20.
DId. at 522, 41 P.2d at 23.
aCompare Mjelde, supra note 13 with Northern Pac. Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra
note 17.
'Northern Pac. fly. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 106, 169 P. at 56.
1Id. at 107-8, 169 P. at 56.
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35
and allow taxation of them
bid the taxation of mineral deposits in 3situ
6
tax.
proceeds
net
a
of
only in the form

Notwithstanding this, the judicial definitions
''mine" or "mining claim" have been worked out
Montana Supreme Court and are important both
guide toward understanding the theory of Section

of what constitutes a
at some length by the
intrinsically and as a
3.

A "mine" within the contemplation of Section 3 is developed mining
property yielding, or capable of yielding, revenue. 37 An undeveoped or
undiscovered mineral deposit is not a "mine. ' '3 The term refers to the
extraction and recovery of virgin ore. Thus, a plant for the recovery of
ore from a visible and distinct tailings dump is not40 a "mine" 39 but is
subject to ad valorum taxation as personal property.
"

A "mine"

is not necessarily a single shaft 41 but may consist of ex-

tensive mineral workings. Whether or not an operation is one "mine"
depends on such factors as unity of ownership, relative location, and integration of operation and management. 4 2 The character of the legislation, under which a developed mine is acquired, is irrelevant. 43 It is subject to tax on its net proceeds whether the land was acquired as mineral
lands, under the Homestead Act, or as part of a grant to a railroad.
In contrast to a "mine," the source of the original grant from the
United States is all important for a "mining claim." A "mining claim"
is a ".

.

. tract of land to which the right of possession or the title has

been acquired pursuant to the Acts of the Congress relating to the disposition of mineral lands." ' 44 So long as such a claim remains in private

Id. at 105, 169 P. at 55.
Id. at 105, 169 P. at 56
'Mjelde, supra note 13 at 300, 137 P. at 390; Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at
516, 41 P.2d at 21. However, in Northern Pac. By. v. Musselshell County, supra note
16 at 112, 169 P. at 58, it is stated that ''coal and iron in place may be a mine in
a proper sence of that term . . . and we are convinced that it is such within the
meaning of the word as used in Section 3 of Article XII." This holding is not
really consistent with the underlying theory of Section 3 as developed in the case
law cited in this paper, although it has not been expressly disapproved. The difficulty seems to be in attempting to work the holding that Section 3 applies to all
It
mineral deposits in the state into a workable definition of the word "mine."
would seem preferable to simply let the holding stand as is, since it seems to be in
accord with the constitutional purpose, and thereby avoid the semantic difficulties
the court encountered in Mjelde.
"Mjelde, supra note 13 at 300, 137 P. at 390.
T
Foremaan v. Beaverhead County, 117 Mont. 557, 560-1, 161 P.2d 524, 526 (1945).
Note, however, that subsequently the legislature amended the statute involved (now
R.C.M.1947, § 84-5402) to tax the net proceeds of tailing dumps. Laws of Montana
ch. 95, § 1 (1947). In view of the constitutional basis of Foreman, it is at least
debatable whether such an enactment is valid. To date, however, there has been no
reported litigation challenging the amended statute.
40Id. at 561, 161 P.2d at 526. But if such tailings become scattered back into the
earth they once more become the subject of "mining."
'United States Gypsum Co. v. Schreiner, 135 Mont. 312, 322, 340 P.2d 548, 554 (1959).
42Id.
"Mjelde, supra note 13 at 303, 137 P. at 391; Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at
522, 41 P.2d at 23.
"Mjelde, supra note 13 at 303, 137 P. at 391. Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at
515-6, 41 P.2d at 20.
T
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ownership, it retains its character as a "mining claim.'' 45 and neither
any act of the owner 46 nor a judicial finding 47 that the mineral reserves
are exhausted will serve to alter the character of the claim or reduce its
value for tax purposes.
Initially, the owner of a "mining claim" owns everything from the
surface of the land to the center of the earth, except for such rights as
are reserved by the Federal Government. 48 Like the concept of title in
fee simple, the term "mining claim" is a term embracing a collection of
many rights. The tax on a "mining claim" is a tax on the whole of these
rights49 and not merely a substitute for ad valorum taxation of the sur51
face5" or a tax on the minerals in situ. '
It has never been authoritatively determined whether it is possible
to divide a "mining claim" by horizontal, as distinguished from vertical,
52
severance of the claim In Superior Coal Co. v. Musselshell County it
was held that where a person sells the surface rights to land constituting
a "mining claim," reserving the mineral rights and the right to use of
the surface for exploration and mining purposes, he retains the "mining
claim" in toto and is to be assessed on its entire value.5 3 That decision
was based on the theory that the owner, by devoting the surface of the
"mining claim" to a separate and independent use, in effect, creates a
new taxable estate in the surface. 54 The selling of this separate estate was
held not to affect the ownership of the "mining claim" itself. 55
"Mining claims" are taxable at the price paid the United States. 56
This value is "fixed and immutable," 5 7 and the taxing authorities are
without power to find that the land is no longer a mining claim 58 or to
classify the property in such a way that it is assessed at less than 100
percent of the price paid the United States. 59 The taxation of "mining
claims" at this arbitrary valuation 6 is part of a comprehensive scheme
to compel mine operators to pay their fair share of the cost of government, while avoiding the evil of ad valorun taxation of minerals in place. 61

'Morris Development Co., supra note 12 at 209, 11 P.2d at 777.
"Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 514, 41 P.2d at 20.
47Morris Development Co., supra note 12 at 209, 11 P.2d at 777.
"Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 518, 41 P.2d at 22.
'Id. at 517, 41 P.2d at 21.
5Morris Development Co., supra note 12 at 207, 11 P.2d at 776.

OId. at 208, 11 P.2d at 776.
"Superior Coal Co., supra note 23.
"Id. at 516-7, 522, 41 P.2d at 21, 23.
"Id. at 519, 41 P.2d at 22.
Id. at 521, 41 P.2d at 23.
-Id. at 515, 41 P.2d at 20.
57

Morris Development Co., supra note 12 at 208, 11 P.2d at 776.
Id. at 209, 11 P.2d at 777.
wState ex. rel. Hinz, supra note 12 at 485, 230 P. at 580.
"Hinz, supra note 9 at 510, 267 P. at 1115-6.
G1Mjelde, supra note 13 at 296, 137 P. at 388.
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As such, it has been held not to constitute a deprivation of due process62 or equal protection 63 under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
As was stated
not merely on the
for some separate
"mining claim ' 6 4

above, the tax is on the mining claim as a whole and
surface. It follows then that the value of the surface
and independent use cannot become the value 65
of the
even if all the minerals thereon are exhausted.

In summary, it appears that the Montana Supreme Court has drawn
a dichotomy between "mines" and "mining claims," notwithstanding
the literal language of Section 3 which couples the two words together.
The former is related to the final clause of Section 3, which imposes a
net proceeds tax, while the latter apparently applies only to that clause
which provides that such property shall be taxed at the price paid the
United States. 6
As a practical matter, this distinction probably makes little difference since an undeveloped mining claim would obviously have no net
proceeds to tax and the vast majority of mineral lands were sold by the
United States without taking the potential mineral wealth into account
in the selling price. A problem might arise, however, if a person purchased developed mining property from the United States at a price which
reflected the apparent value of the mineral wealth in place. By the literal
language of Section 3, such property would be subject to tax at that price
(which would, of course, reflect the value of the minerals in situ) and
on the net proceeds of the mine. Such a circumstance would almost certainly lead to litigation and would force the Supreme Court to re-examine the incongruities of its previous holdings, as well as raising severe
equal protection questions. However, to this date, the problem has not
formally presented itself.
UNLESS THE SURFACE GROUND . . . IS USED FOR OTHER THAN MINING

"...

PURPOSES..."

From the above, it is possible to deduce the principles surrounding
the operation of the "surface clause" of Section 3. As noted above, a
''mining claim" is arbitrarily taxed at the price paid the United States
in order that the claim contribute something to the revenues of the state.
The tax is on the claim as a whole, and not merely on the surface rights.
It is presumed that the surface is of value only in extracting the minerals.

67

OSuperior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 523, 41 P.2d at 24.
651d.
"Hinz, supra note 9 at 511, 267 P. at 1116.

6Morris Development Co., supra note 12 at 209, 11 P.2d at 777.
"But cf. Act of Feb. 21, 1879, supra note 7.
7Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 521, 41 P.2d at 22.
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When the owner of a claim devotes the surface to a separate and independent use, he has in effect created a new taxable estate68 which is
taxable at its value for such independent use.6 9 This tax is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, the constitutional tax on the "mining claim. "70
The word "surface" as used in Section 3 refers to the superficial
part of the land. 71 In order for the tax to be imposed, it is not necessary
for the surface use to be any more extensive than proper uses require,
72
for example, for grazing, agricultural, or townsite purposes.
Before the surface may be taxed, two conditions must be met. First,
the land must have a value for purposes separate and independent from
73
mining. Second, the land must actually be used for such other purposes.
In other words, the fact that the surface of a "mining claim" may have
a high potential or speculative value for other purposes, e.g. for townsite purposes, will not cause the claim to be taxed on its value for such
other purposes unless it is actually so used. 74 However, substance controls over form, and if the surface is actually used for other purposes,
it will be subject to tax, notwithstanding pretenses to the contrary. 75 The
burden of establishing a separate and independent use lies with the tax76
ing authorities.
. . . ALL MACHINERY

USED IN

MINING,

AND

ALL PROPERTY OR SURFACE

IM-

PROVEMENTS..."

Section 3 sets up a double standard for machinery used in mining
and improvements or other physical additions to mines and mining claims.
The machinery is subject to ad valorun taxation as is other personal
property. Improvements and additions, on the other hand, are totally exempted from taxation so long as they are used only for mining purposes.
In Hale v. Jefferson County7 7 it was held that a standard similar to
that governing the assessment of the surface of a mining claim is to be
used in assessing improvements to mining property. That is, in order for
the improvements to be taxed, they must have both a separate and independent value and actually be used for other than mining purposes.
It should be noted at this point that such a decision was not required of the court by the literal language of Section 3. That section
states that the surface ground shall be taxed if it "...
is used for other
68Barnard Realty Co., supra note 16 at 164, 154 P. at 948.
1Id., 154 P. at 947.
7'Hinz, supra note 9 at 510, 267 P. at 1115 (overruling on this point Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 113, 169 P. at 58).
nSuperior
Coal Co., supra note 23 at 518, 41 P.2d at 22.
2
' Id.

"Barnard Realty Co., supra note 16 at 164, 154 P. at 948.
74

1d.

75Murray v. Hinds, 30
76
Barnard Realty Co.,
7

Mont. 466, 471-2, 76 P. 1039, 1040 (1904).
supra note 16 at 164, 154 P. at 948.
- Hale, supra note 28 at 143, 101 P. at 976 (mining ditch which had a potential
separate and independent value as irrigation ditch, but not used as such, held not
subject to tax).
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than mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value. .. "
[emphasis supplied]. It only requires that improvements be taxed if
they have a value "separate and independent of such mine or mining
claim . '',7
...

THE ANNUAL

NET PROCEEDS . . . SHALL BE TAXED AS PROVIDED BY LAW."

As previously noted, a net proceeds tax 9 is imposed on mines in lieu
of ad valorum taxation of their mineral deposits. This tax should be carefully distinguished from the gross proceeds tax on mines.8 0 The latter
is a license tax, imposed for the privilege of doing business in the state,
8
and has a different constitutional basis entirely. '
The net proceeds tax is imposed on any person extracting from a
mine or tailings dump 8 2 precious stones or valuable minerals, including
oil and gas.8 3 Such a person must file a verified statement of gross yield
with the State Board of Equalization.8 4 The statement must contain the
quantity of minerals extracted, the gross yield in dollars and cents,8 5 and
the actual cost of extraction, reduction, transportation and sale.86 In addition, the statement must show the amounts of royalties owing or claimed
and the persons who are entitled to or claim them; the cost of construction, repairs, and betterments to mines and the cost of repairs and replacements to reduction works; the assessed valuation of such reduction
works; and the actual cost of fire and workman's compensation insurance
87
coverage.
From this statement the State Board of Equalization computes the
amount of net proceeds.8 8 This is done by deducting from the amount of
gross yield the actual cost of royalties; extraction, reduction, transportation and sale of the ore; workman's compensation and fire insurance

7It is interesting to note the legislative response to the decision in Hale, supra note 28.
R.O.M. 1947, 84-5403 provides in pertinent part that:
No moneys invested in mines or improvements shall be allowed as a deduction [in
computing net proceeds] unless all machinery equipment and buildings represented
by such moneys shall be returned to the county assessor of the county in which such
mine is located for assessment purposes, at the level of assessment of all other
property in such county.
79
The relevant provisions may be found in R.C.M.1947, §§ 84-5401 through 84-5415.
S-R.C.M.1947, §§ 84-2001 through 84-2016.
"'MONT. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1.

"But see, discussion, supra note 40.
SSR.C.M.1947, § 84-5402.
Id. See also Butte & Superior Mining Co. v. McIntyre, 71 Mont. 254, 260, 229 P.
730, 732 (1924) (Constitution does not designate which officer is to collect the net
proceeds tax and therefore the legislature may vest this power in the State Board
of Equalization).
' This gross yield includes any bonus or premium paid for mining over and above
the amount received for the minerals based on a standard market price. Minerals
Engineering Co. v. Greene, 131 Mont. 119, 128, 308 P.2d 977, 981 (1957). Greene
expressly overruled the earlier decision of Klies v. Linnane, 117 Mont. 59, 63, 156 P.2d
183, 186 (1945) which had held that such a bonus or premium was not a part of the
gross yield.
-R.C.M.1947,
§ 84-5402.
87
1d.

"R.C.M.1947, § 84-5403.
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payments; and repairs and replacements of the reduction works.8 9 In addition, depreciation on the reduction works is allowed at the rate of six
percent of the assessed valuation of the works.9 0 Finally, ten percent of
the cost of improvements, betterments and repairs to the mine, incurred
in the current year, is deducted along with ten percent of such costs incurred in each of the preceding nine years.9 '
No expenses may be deducted except those provided for in the
statute 92 and, more particularly, no salaries may be deducted except for
:
those persons working the mine or superintending its management2 nor
may the net proceeds for any one year be averaged so as to include losses
94
from previous years.
After the computation ol net proceeds is completed, the State Board
of Equalization proceeds to assess any royalties paid or claimed. 9 The
assessment is made from the list of royalties in the verified statement.9 6
It is then sent to the county where the mine is located along with the
computation of the mine's net proceeds."' All royalties, except those on
oil and gas, are taxed as personal property, 98 while the net proceeds are
separately assessed as "net proceeds of mines.'"'9 Both net proceeds and
royalties are classified at 100 percent of their full cash value.' 00
If a person fails to file a verified statement, the State Board of
Equalization may proceed to estimate the amount of net proceeds. 0 1 To
aid in this task, it possesses the power of subpoena. 10 2 In addition, the
Board possesses the power to examine the books and records or the mine
0
operator to verify the correctness of the assessment."'
The tax as assessed constitutes a lien on the mine involved, or at least
on the operator's interest therein, and on the buildings and equipment
used in the operation.10 4 The lien may be enforced by either summary

RId.
vid.
'aid.
"E.g., Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Junod, 71 Mont. 132, 138, 227 P. 1001, 1003
(1924) (taxes and insurance may not be deducted from gross yield to compute net

proceeds).
-R.C.M.1947 § 84-5403.
"State ex. rel. Roberts v. State Board of Equalization, 138 Mont. 142, 355 P.2d

150,

§ 84-5408 prescribing such averaging held
contrary to Section 3 which imposes a tax on the annual net proceeds of mines).
5
' R.C.M.1947, § 84-5406.
9Id.
-. C.M.1947, § 84-5409.
sId.
RId.
"MR.C.M.1947, §§ 84-301, 84-302 (net proceeds), 84-5406 (royalties). Note also that
the value of a right of entry (discussed below) is also placed in this classification.
I-R.C.M.1947, § 84-5410.
152

(1960)

(provision

in

R.C.M.1947,

10Id.

'-R.C.M.1947, § 84-5412.
'R.C.M.1947, §§ 84-5405, 84-5413. The former section reads as follows:
The tax so assessed on net proceeds shall be and shall constitute a lien upon all the
right, title and interest of such operator in or to such mine or mining claim and upon
all of the right, title and interest in or to the machinery, buildings, tools and
equipment used in operating said mine or mining claim.
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seizure and sale or court action, as in the case of the enforcement of other
tax liens.' 05
TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
Up to this point the text of Section 3, its construing case law, and
the legislation implementing it have been presented as an integrated
whole. To a large extent this is true. While there has been some inconsistency in the language of the various decisions in the areas heretofore
discussed, the net effect has been an internally consistant theory which
is harmonic with both statutes and Constitution. This most certainly cannot be said of the taxation of oil and gas interests and "rights of entry,"
the matters considered under this and the following headings.
At a glance, it would seem that oil and gas interests would be within
the contemplation of Section 3 and therefore taxable in the same manner as are other mineral interests. True, the Constitutional Convention
probably did not even consider the potential petroleum wealth in the
state, but the language they used, "or other valuable mineral deposits,"
is reasonably susceptible to the construction that its scope would include
all mineral deposits, whether known or unknown at the time of the
Convention.
The Legislative Assembly undoubtedly thought that such was the
case when it amended the net proceeds statutes to tax oil and gas wells. 10
In addition, dicta from a number of Montana cases seem to assume that
an oil well is a "mine" within the contemplation of Section 3 or, at least,
that an oil well is within that Section's contemplation.'0 7
Perhaps there would be no question of the applicability of Section 3
except for the case of Rist v. 71oole County. 0 8 In Rist the defendant

county assessed the property in question at a value which reflected the
probable future oil and gas production.'0 9 In other words, the oil and
gas in place were taxed.

It was enacted as LAWS OF MONTANA ch. 161, § 4 (1933).

Section 84-5413 reads, in

pertinent part:
The taxes on such net proceeds must be levied as the levy of other taxes are provided for, and every such tax is a lien upon the mine or mining claim from which
the ore or mineral products or deposits are mined or extracted, and is a prior lien
upon all personal property and improvements used in the process of extracting such
ore or mineral products or deposits; provided, however, that such personal or real
property is owned by or under lease by the person, partnership, association, or
corporation who extracted said ore, or mineral products or deposits.
It was last amended in 1925 and las, of course, never been repealed. The reader is
invited to ponder the differences between the two sections, if any, and to reflect upon
the present state of the law in Montana.
R.C.M.1947, § 84-5413.
'"LAWS
OF MONTANA ch. 139, § 1 (1927).
1
17Forbes v. Mid-Northern Oil Co., 100 Mont. 10, 13, 45 P.2d 673, 675 (1935); Byrne
v. Fulton Oil Co., 85 Mont. 329, 334-5, 278 P. 514, 517 (1929); Homesteak Exploration Corp. v. Schorgge, 81 Mont. 604, 613, 264 P. 388, 391 (1928).
"tmRist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945).
" Id. at 430, 159 P.2d at 341.
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Rist did not squarely hold that oil and gas interests were subject to
ad valorun taxation. Rather, it was decided on the standing issue that
the plaintiff, as a mere holder of a royalty interest, could not sue to
enjoin the issuance of a tax deed but was limited to redeeming the property. 110 However, there was not the slightest intimation, except in the
dissent, 1 ' that the assessment was in any way improper. And any possible misimpression caused by that case has not been corrected since.
If other counties follow the example of Toole County, encouraged
by the omissions of Rist, a most difficult situation would arise. The oil
and gas would be taxed in situ. At the same time, the net proceeds of the
wells would be taxed under Chapter 54 of Title 84, R.C.M. Since the
net proceeds tax is in lieu of, and not in addition to, ad vatorun taxation, 1 2 this form of double taxation is almost certainly a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The writer must confess that he does not know whether or not this
is the current practice of any county, but would suspect that if the situation ever amounted to double taxation per se, counsel for the oil industry
would certainly rectify it. It is still possible, however, that undeveloped
oil and gas in place is being taxed At least, the potential for such action
exists and will continue to exist until tile misimpressions of Rist are corrected.
TAXATION OF "RIGHTS OF ENTRY"
If Rist can be considered a mere judicial aberration, without current practical effect, the same cannot be said of the decisions concerning
"rights of entry." The litigation over the taxability of this rather obscure property right has been relatively extensive. Yet, the body of law
which has developed is self-contradictory and inconsistent with the larger
purposes of Section 3, almost to the point of being arbitrary and capricious.
A "right of entry" is the right to enter land to explore for minerlls
and to extract the same where found.1 13 It is an incorporeal hereditament
to land and is to he distino'ished from the corporeal hereditament of the
minerals in place.114
The tax on the right was, in the first instance, judge made. In
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Musselshell Co.nty,1 15 the court had under consideration the taxability of certain land which the plaintiff railway had
sold reserving mineral rights and the right to enter the surface for the
purposes of exploring for and extracting minerals. A tax imposed on the

"11d. at 442, 159 P.2d at 346.
11id. at 443, 159 P.2d at 346.
"'Northern Pac. Ry., supra note 17.
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 112, 169 P. at 58.

1Id.; Hinz, supra note 9 at 512, 267 P. at 1116. Cf. R.C.M.1947, § 67-601 which
defines the right to take minerals from land as a servitude which may be attached
to other land in the form of an easement.
"Worthern Pac. Ry., supra note 17.
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right of entry was upheld on the grounds that as a mere incorporeal
hereditament it was distinguisable from the minerals in place and, since
the right was presumably valuable, it was taxable under the general provision" 16 that all property in the state, not exempt, is subject to taxation. 11 7 The validity of such a tax has been repeatedly upheld by the
118
Montana Supreme Court.
In 1921 the tax classification statute'1 9 was amended 120 to explicitly
tax reserved rights of entry and to place them in the 100 percent classification, along with the net proceeds of mines. In the absence of satisfactory legislative history, it is difficult to determine the exact intent of
the Legislative Assembly in passing this amendment. It might well have
been merely to codify the Northern Pacific Ry. case, or it might have
been to change the holding of that case that rights of entry were to be
taxed "as an interest in reality. ''121 It is clear, however, that there is not
the slightest intimation, either in the text of the statute or in the circumstances surrounding its passage, to exempt non-reserved rights of
entry from taxation 122 or to modify the general statute providing for
2
taxation of all property in the state not exempt.1 3
Nevertheless, in Cranston v. Musselshell County'2 4 the court unanimously held that a conveyed, as distinguished from a reserved, right of
entry was not subject to tax.'2 5 The grounds for the court's decision are
somewhat obscure. Mention was made of the fact that R.C.M. 84-301 and
the Northern Pacific Ry. case, by their express terms, applied only to reserved rights of entrly. 2 6 The court then discussed Hale v. Jefferson
County 727 and held that an easement for a right of entry like an easement for the mining ditch involved in that case "have no value independent of the dominant estate they serve. ''128
The opinion's final paragraphs hold that histdrically a distinction
was recognized between reserved and conveyed rights of entry, with the
former constituting a distinct taxable estate, and that therefore a conveyed right of entry could not constitutionally be taxed.129 No mention

n6 MONT. Rzv. CODES 1907, § 2498 (now R.C.M.1947, § 84-201).
uNorthern Pao. Ry. v. Musselshell County, supra note 17 at 112, 169 P. at 58.
'Id.; Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Ravalli County, 52 Mont. 422, 425, 158 P. 682,
683 (1913); iHinz, supra note 9 at 512, 267 P. at 1116; Lehfeldt v. Adams, 130
Mont. 395, 398, 303 P.2d 934, 936 (1956).
u9LAws OF MONTANA ch. 51, § 1 (1919) (now R.C.M. 84-301 in modified form).
'LAws OF MONTANA ch. 248, § 1 (1921).
"'Northern Pac. Ry., supra note 17 at 112, 169 P. at 58. Under the then existing
classification statute an "interest in realty" would probably be classified as land
and assessed at 30% of its true and fair value. LAWS OF MONTANA ch. 54, §§ 1, 2
(1919).

1'2 But see, MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
... MONT. REV. CODES 1907, § 2498 (now R.C.M.1947, § 84-201).
2427 Mont. St. Rptr. 677, (Mont. S. Ct. No. 11790, Sept. 8, 1970).
"'Id. at 681.
11Id. at 678-9.
17 Hale, supra note 28.
"Cranston, supra note 124 at 681.
"'Id.
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was made in the opinion of either Article XII, Section 2, which enuerates the types of property which may be exempted from taxation, or of
R.C.M. 84-201, which states that all property in the state, not exempt, is
to be taxed.
The value of the "right of entry" is to be deducted from the separate and independent value of the surface in determining the taxable
valuation of the latter. 3 ' It is not an clement of the value of a "mining
claim," and, if such a right is reserved, the owner of the claim is to be
taxed on the value of the reseervation in addition to the tax on the claim
13
as such. '
If the subtleties of the court's reasoning escape the reader, lie is
not alone. Under the current state of Motnana law, if a person is granted
a right of entry, it is not taxable in any event. Yet, if an owner of a
''mining claim" conveys away the surface and reserves such a right,
lie
must pay taxes on both the claim and the right. Since the value of this
right is to be deducted from the separate and independent value of the
surface and not from the taxable value of the "mining claim,' '132 it must
be that such a right forms an element of the separate and independent
value of the surface. Yet, how the right to explore for and extract minerals can be separate and independent of a mining claim baffles the
imagination.
The problem seems to be that the court has been dogmatically trying
to answer the question of whether a right of entry is constitutionally
taxable, without first determining the preliminary question of whether,
on the facts of the particular case, the value of the right is in fact separate and independent of the "mining claim" or minerals in place, as
the case may be.
It is necessary for this determination to realize that a right of entry
has the capability of being either dependent on or independent of the
underlying mineral wealth. After all, such a right is a mere profit a
prente, which is not the same as the corporeal hereditament of the minierals in place It is possible for a landowner to grant to another the
right to enter his land, explore for minerals and extract them where
found for, say, a period of years. No one would dispute that the grantor
still owned the minerals in place nor that the grantee owned a property
right which could turn out to be very valuable.
Once this essential realization is made, the question of the taxability
of rights of entry becomes merely one of setting limits. It might be that
only a non-exclusive right of entry, e.g. one which is not connected to
any mineral rights, possesses sufficient "separate and independent value"
Hinz, supra note 9 at 512, 267 P. at 1116; Anaconda Copper Mining Co., supra note
118 at 425, 158 P. at 683; Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at 522, 41 P.2d at 23.
""Hinz, supra note 9 at 512, 267 P. at 1116; Superior Coal Co., supra note 23 at
522, 41 P.2d at 23.
"See cases cited, supra note 130.
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to be subject to tax. Or, the line might be drawn between rights which are
attached to "mining claims" and those which are attached to mere mineral rights. But whatever the decision, it is essential that the court correct the present state of affairs, and do it as soon as possible.
CONCLUSION:
THE VALUE OF SECTION 3
In writing this article, I have attempted to avoid commenting on
the social, political, or legal wisdom of Section 3 as a whole, as distinguished from the particular cases construing it. The former have been
reserved for this heading.
The fact that Section 3 was adopted primarily to benefit an industry which, at least in the past, has had a disproportionately large voice
in the government of this state, should not blind one's eyes to the fact
that that Section is an attempt, however crude, to deal with the unique
economic characteristics of mineral exploitation. In order to place these
remarks in perspective, it is necessary to briefly detail these characteristics.
The first and most important of these is that ultimately the value
of a mineral right is a derived value. That is, the value of the right to
mine minerals is derived from the value of the minerals themselves. And
minerals are of economic use to society only to the extent that they are
severed from the earth and made available for production.
It follows that any value placed oin undeveloped mineral resources
is essentially speculative. Such value is dependent on such factors as the
estimated quantity of minerals, the technological and economic feasibility of mining them, and the market price of the minerals as severed.
It need only be added that a change in any one of these factors will change
the value placed on the mineral right. In addition, minerals are depletable resources. This is important for two reasons. First, as a practical
matter, the full fair market value of mining property is never utilized
in any one taxable period. Second, assuming all other factors remain
equal, the fair market value of mining property will tend to decrease as

the minerals contained in it are extracted.
In evaluating any tax used as a revenue source, as distinguished
from a tax used as a reglatory device, several criteria have traditionally
been used. Among these are the tax's inherent fairness, its effect on the
underlying revenue base, the relative stability or dependability of revenue collection, and the ease of administration of the tax. When the economic characteristics of mineral exploitation are evaluated in light of
these criteria, it becomes clear that some form of proceeds tax is far superior to the ad valorint taxation of minerals in place.
First, a proceeds tax tends to be fairer because it taxes the real economic interest involved; that is, the minerals as severed. The fair market
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1971
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value of the minerals in place, to a large extent, reflects only potential
real economic wealth. If this potential value were assessed, at any reasonable classification percentage, it would constitute an obstacle to the further development of the state's mineral resources, unless some form of
tax relief were made available to the mining industry. This is because the
taxes due for the initial years of development would amount to a pro13
hibitively high percentage of the value of the minerals extracted. 3
This situation would not continue indefinitely, however. A.s the
minerals are extracted, the assessed value of the property, and therefore
the tax revenues of the state and its subdivisions, would decrease.1 34 In
fact, the amount of taxes due would tend to vary inversely with the quantity of minerals extracted. 135 Obviously, such an inducement to maximize production would not contribute to the wise consumption of depletable natural resources. By contrast, the tax revenues from a proceeds
tax vary directly with production. The mine operator is not tempted to
maximize production merely to minimize his property taxes. While the
government cannot be assured of constantly increasing (or even stable)

'Assume

the following facts: mining land with a fair market value of $1,000,000
taxed on its ad valorum value and that it is to be classified with other land
at 30% of its fair and true value. Assume further that minerals worth $100,000
would be produced each year for ten years, at which time the land would become
worthless. Then given a total millage levy of 200 mills, the tax due the first year
would be $60,000 [($1,000,000 x .30) x .200] or 60% of the gross production for
that year. Of course, the exact figures here are incorrect to the extent that the fair
market value of land is less than the total value of its severed contents. Nevertheless,
the principal would remain the same. It should be noted also that the tax due here
would be the same even if no minerals were produced.
mAssuming the same facts as above, the value of the land in the tenth year would
be $100,000 ($1,000,000 less $100,000 per year for nine years). The taxes in that
year would be only $6,000 [($100,000 x .30) x .200] or only 6% of the mineral
product for that year.
5
" Under the state of facts assumed in note 137, the amount of taxes paid year year
would be
Year
Land Value
Tax
1
$1,000,000
$ 60,000
2
900,000
54,000
3
800,000
48,000
4
700,000
42,000
5
600,000
36,000
6
500,000
30,000
7
400,000
24,000
8
300,000
18,000
9
200,000
12,000
10
100,000
6,000

is to be

Total
$330,000
If, however, the land owner doubled production, only $180,000 would be realized by
the government, as shown by the following table.
Tax
Land Value
Year
1
$1,000,000
$ 60,000
2
800,000
48,000
3
600,000
36,000
4
400,000
24,000
5
200,000
12,000
$180,000
Finally, if the owner elected to leave the land idle he would have to pay a total
of $600,000 ($60,000 x 10) for the ten year period.
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tax revenues from this source, at least it is not assured of constantly decreasing revenues, as under an ad valorum tax scheme.
Finally, the administrative advantages of a proceeds tax should not
be overlooked. Under the present law the net proceeds tax is substantially self-assessing. The duties of the State Board of Equalization and
the county assessor are limited to the purely ministerial acts of computing the net proceeds, applying the millage levy, and sending out the
tax statements. Duplication and wasted effort are minimized, since the
State Board calculates the net proceeds for all mines in the state Also,
under the present scheme the value of the underlying "mine or mining
claim" is irrelevant.
Under an ad valorum tax scheme, value of the mining property becomes all important because it is what is to be taxed. While it is not impossible to assess such property, its accurate valuation would require
specialized training in engineering and economics far above the expertise of the average county assessor. And this valuation could change almost overnight due to changes in technology or the economy.
This is not to say that the present form of net proceeds tax is the
best or fairest means of taxing mineral interests. It might be preferable
to levy ad valorum taxes on all minerals as they are severed (in effect a
"gross proceeds" tax) or to have the State Board of Equalization assess
the proceeds of all mineral interests uniformly. These are offered only
by way of example. Such conclusions would require an economic study
of Montana's mining industry far beyond the scope of this article.
Whatever has been said about the wisdom of the basic purpose behind Section 3 does not apply to the means by which it has been carried
into effect. To be blunt, the section is artlessly drafted. Such features as
the conjunction of "mines" and "mining claims" when two different
concepts were apparently intended, the enumeration of minerals and
types of mining, and the general verbosity of the section have all contributed to a general confusion about the meaning of Section 3. That confusion has, in turn, generated much of the litigation which is the subject
of this article.
But perhaps the most damning feature of Section 3 is that it is in
the Constitution at all. The measure has a wise legislative purpose, its
draftmanship is passable; but even if it were perfect, that would be no
reason to immortalize it in the stone of constitutional mandate.
The Proceedings and Debates 36 are replete with examples of how
the members of the Constitutional Convention viewed themselves as a
sort of super-legislature whose goal was to embody in the Constitution
as much of the then existing territorial legislation as possible. It was
almost as if they did not realize that conditions by necessity change and

'"PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES,

8upra note 8.
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even a foolish man on the spot stands a better chance of making a correct deecision than even the wisest eighty years previously.
Under Section 3, as adopted, the legislature has been powerless to
clarify its verbose and litigation-breeding language; powerless to adapt
the purpose of that section to changing developments; and powerless to
modify and correct an ill advised court decision.
"It is a wise man who can leave well enough alone." "Well enough"
in this case would seem to be a simple provision granting the legislature
the power to provide the means and form of taxing the proceeds of mineral interests.

3 7

HAROLD V. DYE

"37For example, "The legislature may provide for the taxation of the proceeds of
mineral wealth, in lieu of taxing such property on its value. ''
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